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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
§§ 63-46b-16(l), 78-2a-3(2)(a) and (j), and Rule 14 of the Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure. This appeal is taken from an Order of the Utah Labor Commission denying 
Mr. James Hall's (hereinafter "Mr. Hall") Motion for Review and subsequent Motion for 
Reconsideration, which was then appealed to the Utah Court of Appeals. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Pursuant to Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure ("URAP") Rule 24(b)(1), 
Consolidated Freightways (hereinafter "Consolidated") is dissatisfied with the issues 
presented for review and believes the following issues to be pertinent in this case: 
1.) Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16(4)(g), the issue presented for review 
is whether the Labor Commission's determination that Mr. Hall was owed limited 
temporary total disability benefits for failing to document further light duty restrictions, 
failing to document requested light duty, and failing to show that his requests for light 
duty were denied were supported by substantial evidence. Mr. Hall must prove that he 
has been substantially prejudiced by an agency action based upon a determination of fact, 
made or implied by the agency, that is not supported by substantial evidence when 
viewed in light of the whole record before the court. Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16(4)(g). 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: The Utah Supreme Court has found that "where the 
issue is purely factual, appellate review is highly deferential, requiring reversal only if a 
finding is clearly erroneous." Drake v. Industrial Comm'n,, 939 P.2d 177, 181 (Utah 
1997) (citations omitted). When reviewing the factual findings of the administrative 
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agency, the reviewing court "will generally reverse only if the findings are not supported 
by substantial evidence." Id. (citations omitted). Any challenge to the Labor 
Commission's findings of fact will fail without marshaling the evidence in support of 
those findings. Albert v. Ameritemps Inc., 2005 UT App 491, ^ 27 n.5, 128 P.3d 31, 
citing, Campbell v. Box Elder County, 962 P.2d 806, 808 (Utah Ct. App. 1998). 
PRESERVATION ON APPEAL 
On November 30, 2004, the Labor Commission issued its Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law and Order. (Appellate Record Index Number (hereinafter "AR") 47-
50). On January 4, 2006, the Labor Commission issued its Supplemental Findings of 
Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order. (AR 58-63). Mr. Hall filed his Motion for Review 
before the Utah Labor Commission on February 3, 2006 (AR 64-68). The Labor 
Commission denied his motion for review' (AR 91-94) on February 28, 2006, after which 
he filed a Motion for Reconsideration on March 16, 2006 (AR 95-99). Mr. Hall's Motion 
for Reconsideration was denied on April 28, 2006 (AR 107-109). Mr. Hall filed his 
Petition for Review with the instant Court on May 30, 2006. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case: Mr. Hall filed his claim for workers' compensation benefits 
after having been laid off by Consolidated. He filed his claims for medical expenses and 
temporary total disability. After sending this matter to the medical panel and conducting 
an evidentiary hearing, the Labor Commission awarded Mr. Hall limited temporary total 
disability benefits. Mr. Hall filed the instant appeal seeking additional temporary total 
disability benefits. 
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Course of Proceedings: On December 28, 2001, Mr. Hall filed his Application 
for Hearing seeking workers' compensation benefits as a result of an industrial accident. 
(AR 2). Consolidated files its Answer to the Application for Hearing denying the claim. 
(AR 12-15). On January 28, 2004, both parties stipulated to have the case go directly to a 
medical panel. (AR 30-33). On March 26, 2004, the medical panel issued its report. 
(AR 37-46). The Commission issued its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order 
as a result thereof. (AR 47-50). 
After issuing its initial Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order, the 
Commission scheduled an evidentiary hearing to determine whether light duty was 
available. (AR 51). Based upon the evidentiary hearing, the Commission issued its 
Supplemental Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order on January 4, 2006. (AR 
58-63). Mr. Hall filed his Motion for Review before the Utah Labor Commission on 
February 3, 2006 (AR 64-68). The Labor Commission denied his motion for review (AR 
91-94) on February 28, 2006, after which he filed a Motion for Reconsideration on March 
16, 2006 (AR 95-99). Mr. Hall's Motion for Reconsideration was denied on April 28, 
2006 (AR 107-109). Mr. Hall filed his Petition for Review with the instant Court on May 
30, 2006. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. Mr. Hall was employed by Consolidated as a driver since October 2, 1999 and 
was employed as of October 23, 2001. (AR 59). 
2. Mr. Hall did not participate in loading or unloading his truck during the course 
of his employment with consolidated, but worked as a delivery driver. (AR 59). 
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3. He drove with his right arm on the gear shift and noted a fair amount of 
vibration in the gear shift while using the truck. (AR 59). 
4. He alleged that in the spring of 2000 he began to experience periodic pain in 
his right arm with occasional numbness in his fingers on his right hand and periodic 
numbness in his wrists. (AR 59). 
5. Mr. Hall first treated with a physician on October 29, 2001, because of his 
concerns over his symptoms. (AR 59). 
6. He was diagnosed with right arm overuse and bilateral early overuse of the 
wrists and was told not to drive long-haul until his symptoms resolved. (AR 59). 
7. Mr. Hall received treatment for his symptoms, which his doctors related to his 
industrial work activities. (AR 59). 
8. He underwent an Independent Medical Examination and the independent 
doctor opined that Mr. Hall's symptoms were not work related and Mr. Hall had no 
industrially related work restrictions. (AR 59-60). 
9. The Labor Commission (hereinafter the "Commission") made a finding of fact 
regarding Mr. Hall's knowledge of workers' compensation procedures when it found he 
had made prior claims for a rotator cuff tear at a previous job and a claim for carpal 
tunnel syndrome prior to working for Consolidated. (AR 60). 
10. The Commission also found Mr. Hall was aware of Consolidated's policy 
requiring prompt reporting of any and all injuries believed to be related to industrial work 
activities for Consolidated. (AR 60). 
11. The Commission found Mr. Hall had admitted he had right upper extremity 
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problems for a year and a half before he reported his industrial injury on October 29, 
2001. (AR60). 
12. Mr. Hall reported his industrial injury the day after he was notified that he was 
no longer going to be working for Consolidated as a result of a corporate layoff. (AR 
60). 
13. Consolidated presented evidence to the Commission, and the Commission 
found, that Consolidated sent a letter via certified mail and hand delivery to Mr. Hall on 
October 28, 2001 that Mr. Hall was being laid off from work with Consolidated. (AR 
60). 
14. Mr. Hall prepared a written statement of injury wherein he notified 
Consolidated of his industrial claim on October 28, 2001. (AR 60). 
15. Consolidated presented evidence to the Commission, and the Commission 
found, that Mr. Hall received a letter on January 2, 2002, which provided that he was 
being recalled from the corporate layoff effective January 21, 2002. (AR 60). 
16. Mr. Hall testified that he discussed the layoff with Lew Duffin, a manager with 
Consolidated, on January 2, 2002, after having received the letter recalling him from his 
layoff status. (AR 60-61). 
17. The Commission found pursuant to the medical records that Mr. Hall was 
released to light duty on November 1, 2001, and released to regular duty on December 
18,2001. (AR61). 
18. The Commission found through Mr. Hall's direct testimony that Mr. Hall was 
aware individuals were given light duty, which was consistent with the testimony from 
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ex-Consolidated Managers Roy Johnson and Steve Hillstead. (AR 61). 
19. Based upon the foregoing, the Commission weighed the evidence presented in 
the case and determined that Mr. Hall's allegations regarding the absence of light duty 
work was not credible due to Mr. Hall's self-serving statements, his lack of 
documentation regarding light duty work, and lack of supporting evidence regarding the 
availability of light duty work. (AR 61). 
20. As a result, the Commission found that "[although it is questionable whether 
[Mr. Hall] presented documentation to [Consolidated], of his medical restrictions that 
would justify any temporary total disability compensation, but giving him the benefit of 
the doubt ... [Mr. Hall's] temporary total disability period would be from 10/29/01 
through 12/18/01." (AR62). 
21. Finally, the Commission found there was not a preponderance of the evidence 
to support Mr. Hall's claims "that he thereafter contemporaneously documented further 
light duty restrictions, requested light-duty, or that it was denied." (AR 62). 
22. Upon Review, the Commission found Mr. Hall was able to return to his usual 
work duties by December 18, 2001, and despite the fact Mr. Hall may have continued to 
suffer from some symptoms, those symptoms did not prevent him from doing his regular 
job duties. (AR93). 
23. Upon Review, the Commission determined that any light duty discussions 
were unnecessary as Mr. Hall was able to return to his regular work duties as of 
December 18,2001. (AR93). 
24. Consequently, the Commission determined that it did not need to discuss 
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whether light duty was available to Mr. Hall as a result of his ability to continue his 
normal job functions, which were within his work restrictions. (AR 93). 
25. Upon Reconsideration, the Commission upheld its view that Mr. Hall was able 
to return to work on December 18, 2001 and was not temporary and totally disabled as of 
that date. (AR 107). 
26. The Commission found that Mr. Hall was able to perform his regular work 
duties after December 18, 2001, it did not matter whether light duty was offered as Mr. 
Hall was no longer considered to be temporarily and totally disabled. (AR 107). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
Consolidated's position on appeal is Mr. Hall failed to marshal the evidence to 
overturn a factual finding made by the Administrative Law Judge and a finding made by 
the Labor Commission on review. Mr. Hall provides conclusive statements that the 
Commission's orders were not supported by the greater weight of evidence, but then fails 
to marshal the evidence in support of the Commission's ruling. This failure allows the 
Court of Appeals to make a finding that the evidentiary findings of the Commission are 
supported by substantial evidence. If the findings are supported by substantial evidence 
then Mr. Hall cannot show prejudice under Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16(4)(g) and his 
appeal fails for lack of prejudice as a result of the factual findings. 
Consolidated further argues that Mr. Hall has failed to show that under the facts of 
the case he is entitled to additional amounts of temporary total disability. The 
Commission found that Mr. Hall was released to full duty on December 18, 2006, by his 
doctors. Given his stipulated work restrictions and his testimony at the evidentiary 
10 
hearing, Mr. Hall was properly found to have been released to full duty on December 18, 
2001 and, as a result, Mr. Hall is not entitled to additional amounts of temporary total 
disability. 
ARGUMENTS 
I. BECAUSE MR. HALL FAILED TO MARSHAL THE EVIDENCE 
CONCERNING THE LABOR COMMISSION'S FINDINGS OF FACT, 
THIS COURT SHOULD REJECT THE CHALLENGE AND FIND THE 
COMMISSION DECISION IS SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL 
EVIDENCE 
Mr. Hall's appeal should be denied and the Commission's ruling upheld as a result 
of Mr. Hall's failure to properly challenge the findings of fact made by the Commission. 
If challenging a factual determination made by the Commission, it is Mr. Hall's 
responsibility to show he has been substantially prejudiced by the agency's findings of 
fact and to show the finding of fact is not supported by substantial evidence. Mr. Hall did 
not properly challenge the Commission's findings of fact and, therefore, Mr. Hall's 
appeal challenging the Commission's findings should be denied and the Commission's 
rulings upheld. 
A failure to properly challenge the findings of fact is fatal as the Court of Appeals 
will find any such failure will be taken as an indication the record supports such findings 
of fact and the Court will not disturb them. Ameritemps v. Labor Comm'n, 2005 UT 
App 491, U 27, 128 P.3d 31, citing, Heber City Corp. v. Simpson, 942 P.2d 307, 312 
(Utah 1997). To show that a finding of fact is not supported by substantial evidence, Mr. 
Hall must marshal the evidence in support of the Commission's findings in his opening 
brief. Id at If 27 n. 5, citing, Campbell v. Box Elder County, 962 P.2d 806, 808 (Utah Ct. 
11 
App. 1998). Mr. Hall failed to properly marshal the evidence in his opening brief and, 
therefore, the Commission's order should be upheld as being substantially supported by 
evidence. 
In his Appellate Brief, Mr. Hall provides conclusive statements that the 
Commission's orders were not supported by the greater weight of evidence, but then fails 
to marshal the evidence in support of the Commission's ruling. In essence, Mr. Hall is 
attempting to reargue his points below without supporting his arguments through 
marshaling. 
The Utah Court of Appeals in Ameritemps ruled that selective recitation of the 
facts is an attempt to indirectly challenge an agency's factual findings. Ameritemps, 
2005 UT App 491 at Tj 27. In addition, the Court provided it "will not disturb the 
[Commission's] findings simply because another conclusion can be drawn from the 
evidence in the record." Id., citing, Whitear v. Labor Comm'n, 973 P.2d 982, 984 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1998) (stating that "findings will 'not be overturned if based upon substantial 
evidence, even if another conclusion from the evidence is permissible.'" (citation 
omitted)). Finally, the Court assumed the facts were supported by substantial evidence as 
a result of the failure to directly challenge the factual findings. Id. 
In this case, Mr. Hall argues in Point I of his Appellant Brief that the 
Commission's finding that Mr. Hall was cleared for regular employment was erroneous. 
Mr. Hall's Appellant Brief, Page 9. Mr. Hall argues that despite the evidence indicating 
Mr. Hall was cleared for regular employment Mr. Hall is entitled to additional temporary 
disability benefits beyond the December 18, 2001 date found by the Commission. 
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Mr. Hall does not marshal the facts in support of the Commission's findings, but 
instead points to facts favorable to his position and argues the Commission should have 
ruled differently as a result of the facts presented by Mr. Hall. As stated by the Court of 
Appeals in Ameritemps, Mr. Hall is indirectly challenging the factual findings of the 
Commission without marshaling the evidence. This amounts to rearguing the case below, 
which is impermissible when a party is seeking to challenge a factual finding by the 
Commission. 
A failure to properly challenge the findings of fact is fatal as the Court of Appeals 
will find any such failure will be taken as an indication the record supports such findings 
of fact and the Court will not disturb them. Ameritemps, 2005 UT App 491 at ^ 27. As a 
result, this Court should find the Commission's finding that Mr. Hall was able to return to 
work on December 18, 2001 and was not temporary and totally disabled as of that date 
(AR 107) was supported by substantial evidence. 
If this Court finds the Commission's factual finding was supported by substantial 
evidence, it must find that Mr. Hall was not substantially prejudiced by a factual finding 
that was unsupported by the substantial evidence. If Mr. Hall was not substantially 
prejudiced by the factual finding, Mr. Hall's appeal of the factual findings of the 
Commission fails and the Court must uphold the Commission's Order. As a result of Mr. 
Hall's failure to marshal the evidence in support of the Commission's findings, this Court 
should deny Mr. Hall's appeal in the instant case. 
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II. BECAUSE THE COMMISSION'S FINDING OF A FULL MEDICAL 
RELEASE WAS SUBSTANTIALLY SUPPORTED BY THE RECORD, 
THIS COURT SHOULD UPHOLD THE COMMISSION FINDINGS, 
CONCLUSIONS AND ORDER 
In his Appellant Brief, Mr. Hall argues that he "was in a light duty status until 
May 9, 2002 due to continuing further treatment, medications and physical therapy." Mr. 
Hall's Appellant Brief, Page 11. Mr. Hall argues that he was on light duty release despite 
medical evidence that he had been released for regular duty on December 18, 2001. Mr. 
Hall did not marshal the evidence in support of the Commission's ruling, but merely 
quoted medical records that supported his position. Despite this defect, Consolidated will 
show the supporting evidence in favor of the Commission's ruling that Mr. Hall was 
released back to work for full duty employment on December 18, 2001. 
Specifically, the Commission's finding that Mr. Hall was released for full duty is 
supported by the medical records exhibit (AR 110). Mr. Hall was released to full duty on 
December 18, 2001, by his treating physician Jeffrey D. Scott, M.D. (AR 110: MEDS 
64). Mr. Hall also submitted his Summary of Medical Record to the Labor Commission 
on December 28, 2001, which provided that Mr. Hall had been released for usual work on 
12/18/01. (AR 1). Mr. Hall's physical therapist provided that Mr. Hall should attain 
stabilization of his symptoms within 3-4 weeks of November 1, 2001 (the date of the 
medical record), which would have placed his stabilization at or around December 18, 
2001. (AR 110: MEDS 21). Mr. Hall's physical therapist placed him at stabilization on 
December 3, 2001. (AR 110: MEDS 41). 
In addition, Mr. Hall's physical capacity evaluation provided that he was able to 
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utilize the majority of his body functions except for repetitive squeezing with his hands. 
(AR 110: MEDS 54). The second physical capacity evaluation conducted on December 
3, 2001, showed marked improvement in all of Mr. Hall's body functions as well as 
lifting capacity. (AR 110: MEDS 61). Mr. Hall's Electrodiagnostic Evaluation also 
returned normal when it was conducted on December 4, 2001 and the doctor anticipated 
full release in 2 weeks time. (AR 110: MEDS 63). Mr. Hall was released to full duty on 
December 18, 2001 by his treating physician. (AR 110: MEDS 64). 
The evidence in light of the entire record supports the Commission's factual 
finding that Mr. Hall was released to full duty on December 18, 2001. Because Mr. Hall 
was released to full duty on December 18, 2001, Mr. Hall was entitled to no additional 
temporary total disability benefits as found by the Labor Commission in its Order on 
Motion Denying Motion for Review (AR 91) and its Order Denying Request for 
Reconsideration (AR 107). This finding is supported by the entire record before the 
Court and, given Mr. Hall's failure to marshal the evidence, this Court should deny Mr. 
Hall's appeal and affirm the Commission's ruling. 
III. DESPITE THE COMMISSION'S FINDING THAT A DISCUSSION OF 
LIGHT DUTY WAS IMMATERIAL, THERE WAS SUBSTANTIAL 
EVIDENCE IN THE RECORD TO SUPPORT THE FINDING THAT 
LIGHT DUTY WAS AVAILABLE TO MR. HALL AFTER DECEMBER 18, 
2001 
Mr. Hall contends in his Appellant Brief that discussion of light duty work is 
material to the instant appeal because under Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-410(2) temporary 
total disability benefits should be paid when restrictions are in place and no light duty is 
available. Mr. Hall's Appellant Brief, Page 10. As noted above, Mr. Hall failed to 
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properly challenge the Commission's finding of full release on December 18, 2001 and 
that fact has now been established. Regardless, Mr. Hall fails to take into account his 
stipulated facts that provided the basis for the Commission's opinion with respect to his 
work duties. 
Specifically, Mr. Hall stipulated that he did not participate in loading or unloading 
the truck during the course of his employment with Consolidated. (AR 59). This fact is 
supported by his testimony at the evidentiary hearing. (AR 111: Page 9:6-21). Given the 
fact Mr. Hall was not required to lift product into his truck, and his restrictions on 
December 18, 2001, allowed him to conduct all normal aspects of life except for selected 
lifting restrictions, there was substantial evidence Mr. Hall was cleared to return to work 
after December 18, 2001. (AR 110: MEDS 64). 
Regardless of the stipulations of fact and his trial testimony regarding the same, 
Mr. Hall argues that light duty was not available to Mr. Hall and argues this allows him 
to collect additional monies for temporary total disability. Mr. Hall's Appellant Brief, 
Page 11. Mr. Hall again failed to marshal the evidence regarding the availability of light 
duty work as found in the Supplemental Order issued by the Commission. The 
Commission originally found that light duty had been available to Mr. Hall, but Mr. Hall 
had declined to take the light duty work available. (AR 61). 
Specifically, the Commission found Mr. Hall had knowledge of the workers' 
compensation procedures when it found he had made prior claims for a rotator cuff tear at 
a previous job and a claim for carpal tunnel syndrome prior to working for Consolidated. 
(AR 60). The Commission also found Mr. Hall was aware of Consolidated's policy 
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requiring prompt reporting of any and all injuries believed to be related to industrial work 
activities for Consolidated. (AR 60). 
The Commission found Mr. Hall had admitted he had right upper extremity 
problems for a year and a half before he reported his industrial injury on October 29, 
2001. (AR 60). Mr. Hall reported his industrial injury the day after he was notified that 
he was no longer going to be working for Consolidated as a result of a corporate layoff. 
(AR 60). Consolidated presented evidence to the Commission, and the Commission 
found, that Consolidated sent a letter via certified mail and hand delivery to Mr. Hall on 
October 28, 2001 that Mr. Hall was being laid off from work with Consolidated. (AR 
60). 
Mr. Hall prepared a written statement of injury wherein he notified Consolidated 
of his industrial claim on October 28, 2001. (AR 60). Consolidated presented evidence 
to the Commission, and the Commission found, that Mr. Hall received a letter on January 
2, 2002, which provided that he was being recalled from the corporate layoff effective 
January 21, 2002. (AR 60). Mr. Hall testified that he discussed the layoff with Lew 
Duffin, a manager with Condolidated, on January 2, 2002, after having received the letter 
recalling him from his layoff status. (AR 60-61). The Commission found pursuant to the 
medical records that Mr. Hall was released to light duty on November 1, 2001, and 
released to regular duty on December 18, 2001. (AR 61). 
The Commission found through Mr. Hall's direct testimony that Mr. Hall was 
aware individuals were given light duty, which was consistent with the testimony from 
ex-Consolidated Managers Roy Johnson and Steve Hillstead. (AR 61). Based upon the 
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foregoing, the Commission weighed the evidence presented in the case and determined 
that Mr. Hall's allegations regarding the absence of light duty work was not credible due 
to Mr. Hall's self-serving statements, his lack of documentation regarding light duty 
work, and lack of supporting evidence regarding the availability of light duty work. (AR 
61). Finally, the Commission found there was not a preponderance of the evidence to 
support Mr. Hall's claims "that he thereafter contemporaneously documented further 
light duty restrictions, requested light-duty, or that it was denied." (AR 62). 
On Review, the Commission noted the discussion on the availability of light duty 
and tacitly agreed with the ALJ's findings regarding the same. (AR 93). The ALJ's 
analysis of light duty availability is supported by substantial evidence in the record. If 
this Court finds that a discussion on light duty is warranted, despite Mr. Hall's full 
release back to work, this Court should find the Commission's findings pertaining to the 
light duty issue to be supported by substantial evidence in the record. 
The ALJ's findings on the light duty issue are supported by the trial transcript. 
Mr. Hall knew the policy of reporting workers' compensation injuries immediately after 
they occurred. (AR 111: Page 8:13-16). He knew that light duty was available while 
working for Consolidated. (AR 111: Page 8:17-22). Mr. Hal acknowledged talking to 
Lew Duffin about his industrial injury on October 29, 2001 (AR 57B) and they sent him 
over to the Salt Lake Industrial Clinic. (AR 111: Page 18:3-10). 
The Commission found that Mr. Hall had received a return to work letter on two 
separate occasions. (AR 57C-57D). This fact was corroborated by Roy Johnson, an ex-
employee of Consolidated. (AR 111: Page 24:22-25). He also provided that light duty 
18 
was available to injured employees. (AR 111: Page 25:4-13). This fact was further 
corroborated by Steven R. Hillstead, an ex-employee of consolidated when asked the 
same questions. (AR 111: Page 32:8-13). 
As a result of the entire record, the Commission's analysis and findings regarding 
the fact that light duty was available to Mr. Hall is supported by substantial evidence in 
the entire record. As a result, Mr. Hall's attempt to have this Court reweigh the evidence 
in his favor should be denied. Mr. Hall did not properly marshal the evidence in support 
of the Commission's findings and, as a result, those findings are deemed to be supported 
by substantial evidence. Regardless, the findings were supported by findings in the 
record and the findings should be upheld. 
Mr. Hall's attempt to challenge the finding of light duty availability fails as a 
result of his failure to marshal the evidence. In addition, prior courts have ruled that 
"when reviewing an agency's decision, [we do] not ... reweigh the evidence." 
Ameritemps, 2005 UT App 491 at *| 27, citing, Questar Pipeline Co. v. Utah State Tax 
Comm'n, 850 P.2d 1175, 1178 (Utah 1993). Mr. Hall would have this Court reweigh the 
evidence presented at the evidentiary hearing despite there being substantial evidence in 
the entire record to support the Commission's rulings in this case. As a result, this Court 
should deny Mr. Hall's appeal and uphold the rulings of the Labor Commission. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing, Consolidated requests this Court deny Mr. Hall's 
appeal for failing to show substantial prejudice as a result of a factual finding of the 
Commission that was not supported by substantial evidence in the record. Mr. Hall failed 
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to properly challenge the Commission's findings of fact and, as a result, those findings 
are presumed to be supported by substantial evidence in the record. If the findings were 
supported by substantial evidence in the record, Mr. Hall cannot show substantial 
prejudice as required on appeal and his appeal fails. This Court, therefore, should deny 
Mr. Hall's appeal and uphold the rulings of the Labor Commission. 
DATED THIS / / day of December, 2006. 
PLANT, CHRISTENSEN& KANELL 
- l v | % o C 
THEODG&RE E. KANELL 
JOSEPH C. ALAMILLA 
Attorneys for Consolidated Freightways (Appellee) 
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ADDENDUM 
Pursuant to Rule 24(a)(ll) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, an 
addendum is not included herewith as the relevant information already has been included 
in Mr. Hall's Appellant Brief. 
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